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Overconsumption, Procreation, and Morality 
John Mariana (College of the Canyons, Santa Clarita, California, United States) 
Introduction 
In an intriguing but mostly overlooked essay, Thomas Young (2001) attempts to 
defend the claim that procreation and overconsumption are morally equivalent, 
and thus that whatever moral judgment we believe applies to one applies to 
the other. Specifically Young means to show that to the extent that one 
condemns overconsumption (for any number of reasons) but finds procreation 
acceptable or even laudable, then one holds an inconsistent set of moral 
convictions, and in particular he targets those whom he calls “mainstream 
environmentalists” as being guilty of such inconsistency (Young 2001, 183).1 So 
his audience is, by his own admission, fairly narrowly specified, and indeed he 
further restricts his ambitions in the essay by refusing to attempt a full defense 
of any specific implication of the claim of moral equivalence. He says that his 
primary interest is in the analogical argument he presents in support of the 
equivalence claim – which claim, for convenience, I shall call ME – and that 
though he finds refraining entirely from procreating to be “the lesser of two 
evils” (the two evils being on the one hand giving up having children, and on the 
other hand lowering the quality of life for all through environmental 
degradation), his support of this position “will be brief, for [his] main concern 
was to expose a bedrock inconsistency in mainstream environmentalism, not 
to defend a particular option (that is, a particular set of consistent beliefs)” 
(Young 2001, 190). 
But the implications of ME are surely more sweeping than Young is 
interested to acknowledge, and the modesty of his proposal seems feigned. If 
ME is true, then even those who see nothing wrong in what Young calls 
overconsumption must accept that procreation is morally legitimate only to the 
extent that it entails the legitimate overconsumption of resources. This makes 
Young’s analogy far more contentious than he makes it seem. Considering how 
much importance he places on the analogy alone, it’s curious that his support of 
it is so glib and hasty. I shall argue that Young’s case for ME does not succeed. I 
                                                             
1 I do not take this claim to be meant as a demographically or sociologically or politically 
accurate generalization –viz., that people who would identify themselves as, or who are 
(by some definition), “mainstream environmentalists” do as a rule hold such a set of 
beliefs – but merely as a means of designating the people Young has in mind. Young’s 
usage here is surely strategic, but whether his use of this terminology for this purpose 
is fair or accurate will not be among my concerns here. 
John Mariana 
 
53 
 
believe that his support for the equivalence claim could be much stronger than 
it is, and I will suggest some ways in which Young’s claims could be more 
effectively defended, as well as explain why I think they are worth serious 
reflection. But I shall also argue that, in the end, this reflection leads to the 
conclusion that ME cannot be supported with the kinds of moral-theoretical 
resources Young deploys. 
Young’s Analogy 
First I should explain how Young attempts to defend ME. As I have said, his basis 
for the equivalency claim is analogical. In fact, he sets up his argument with a 
thought experiment involving two hypothetical families: the Greens and the 
Grays. The Greens, as you’ve probably guessed, have no children and are not 
planning on having any and are average Americans who consume at an average 
American rate and level. The Grays have two children, or plan to, but in all other 
respects are identical to the Greens in terms of resource consumption. By 
having two children, the Grays will increase their total resource-consumption 
footprint by two-and-a-half times. For the Greens to match the Grays without 
children they would have to increase their consumption by an equivalent 
amount, which would mean overconsumption. And since the motives for and 
effects of both choices are essentially the same, procreation and 
overconsumption are morally equivalent. 
So that this isn’t all just abstract theorizing, Young refers at this point 
to another intriguing paper by Hall et al. (1994), titled “The Environmental 
Consequences of Having a Baby in the United States,” for hard scientific data to 
quantify exactly what counts as “average” American consumption at 1990 
levels, and thus what would count as overconsumption – which he defines as 
any consumption that exceeds the average. On this basis he is able to cash out 
the concept of overconsumption in a numerically precise way, so at least he 
isn’t open to the charge of vagueness or of vacuity (that overconsumption 
(excessive consumption) is simply any amount of consumption that would be 
morally blameworthy). But of course this has both the advantages and the 
disadvantages of exactness, and it raises is/ought problems that Young would 
clearly prefer to avoid. 
Even if you don’t count yourself an environmentalist, you’re probably 
wondering why average American consumption isn’t itself, by definition, 
overconsumption. After all, as Hall clearly shows, the average American 
consumes more than 300 times the average of people in some other parts of 
the world.2 But then these are places where the people – by our standards – are 
either desperately poor or adhere to a pre-industrial form of life. So on what 
                                                             
2 Hall (1994) quantifies not only average American consumption, but average 
consumption elsewhere in the world, to provide a basis for comparison. 
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basis are we to say that any group of people overconsume? Isn’t any rate of 
consumption thus relative and not absolute? Ultimately the numbers game is 
not just a trick to make Young’s argument sound scientific. We can say that a 
group of people overconsume relative to the total availability and quantity of 
resources at a given time; and, as is well known by now, Americans consume 
annually more than a quarter of the energy produced worldwide, though we 
represent only a small fraction of the world’s population (less than 10%) 
(Assadourian et al. 2004, 11). This makes average American consumption 
exceedingly demanding on global resources. From a morally neutral, numerical 
point of view, however, rates of consumption are relative. We could say in a 
purely numerical sense that even the average American overconsumes relative 
to some baseline level of average consumption for the rest of the world, or for 
the majority of its population. 
But of course the question whether a rate of consumption 300 times 
the average rate in say, Sri Lanka, is excessive in any moral sense depends on 
both the consequences of the framework of production and consumption that 
includes this disparity and on the even trickier issue of whether the average Sri 
Lankan (or whoever) is capable of consuming enough to have a reasonably 
high quality of life. Of course a judgment of overconsumption – what Young 
rather non-neutrally calls “eco-gluttony” – also implies a moral judgment, and 
not simply a metrical assessment of the relative usage of goods produced to the 
size of a given population. On this point Young is content to simply stipulate: 
any rate of consumption that exceeds the average American rate we shall call, 
for the purposes of this argument, “overconsumption.” He is also content to 
simply appeal to the moral intuitions of his target audience. If you’re inclined 
to be tolerant of the average American rate of consumption, but you think that 
consumption beyond (or much beyond) this level is excessive and bad (or even 
wrong), then ME shows that you must apply the same judgment to procreation. 
All of this will prove significant later on. 
Before we move forward, there’s just one other little wrinkle to address, 
which you’re probably also wondering about. Even if you’re not a 
mathematician you’re probably wondering why the Grays would increase their 
consumption two and a half times by having two children, and not just two 
times. Two people, two units of consumption. So, four people, four units of 
consumption, right? And, for that matter, how come the Gray children count 
toward their parents’ consumption? 
At this point Young makes a fairly obvious (though very important) 
observation which will also prove significant. His observation is this: the 
existence of children, and thus of the additional consumption they will 
represent, is (generally) a direct result of the conscious choices of their 
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parents.3 Thus, your rate of consumption is calculated as a combination of your 
own consumption plus the total lifetime consumption of your children. (If we 
wanted to really lay on the guilt and the sense of overwhelming moral 
responsibility, we should note that Young’s claim here, if true, would imply that 
you are also responsible for your children’s children’s consumption, or at least 
for the portion of it that you will live to subsidize as grandparents and as co-
inhabitants of the planet.) Again for convenience, I shall call this claim that 
parents are morally responsible for their children’s existence and resource 
consumption MR. 
From ME and MR Young derives the calculation that the Grays would 
increase their consumption two and a half times by having two children. If two 
30-year-olds represent 50 more years of consumption apiece, and their two 
children represent 80 years apiece, or 160 years total, then that’s 100 years of 
consumption plus 160 years, or 260 years, which is just over five times the 
average single adult unit; hence, 2.5 times the consumption of two people (5 = 
(2.5)(2)). Again Young is playing the numbers game; of course all of these are 
averages. And he doesn’t seem to take the effects of co-habitation into account – 
that members of the same household tend to share resources (one vacuum and 
one lawnmower for four or more people, say, instead of just for two) – though 
perhaps these effects would be relatively negligible. 
Following his development of the analogy, Young attempts to defend it 
through an assessment and rejection of a variety of potential dissimilarities 
between procreation and overconsumption that would undermine the 
comparison. Obviously the claim most in need of defense here is that the 
motives and effects involved in both activities are really all that’s morally 
relevant. On the face of it this claim doesn’t seem especially plausible. The 
immediately apparent difference between procreation and overconsumption is 
that the one activity results in the existence of more people and the other 
results merely in the consumption of additional stuff. To say that the motives 
underlying these activities and the effects that they produce are all that’s 
morally relevant would seem to imply that, morally speaking, there’s no 
significant difference between bringing someone into existence and buying a 
couple of private jets, which over the course of a lifetime may involve about the 
same quantity of resource consumption and depletion. Of course, this is 
precisely the sort of objection Young anticipates. 
He considers and dismisses four possible dissimilarities between 
procreation and overconsumption, which he labels A through D. They’re not 
                                                             
3 Of course this claim could be challenged, and it would be worth knowing how many 
children of those that are born each year are unplanned (and perhaps why and under 
what circumstances). This isn’t necessarily a quibble, but I’m going to ignore it for the 
remainder of my discussion. Ultimately my criticisms of Young will not in any 
important way depend on the answer to this question. 
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entirely independent of one another, but he does what he can to separate lines 
of counter-argument that might otherwise get run together. Among them they 
represent what would seem to be the most obvious and the most decisive 
objections to the analogy, and Young leaves few stones unturned. To 
summarize, the dissimilarities are: that procreation is less selfish than 
overconsumption (A); that having children is a greater source of happiness 
than overconsumption (B); that procreation is a basic moral right (C); and that 
procreation involves bringing into existence new beings with inherent worth 
or value (D). Each of these could have received better and fuller treatment than 
Young gives them, most especially C, but this is not my main concern. In 
discussing some problems with Young’s handling of these dissimilarities I will 
be building up to a larger criticism of Young’s argumentative strategy as a 
whole. 
The Analogy Defended 
Young dispatches Dissimilarity A fairly quickly. He observes that “the claim that 
a consumer lifestyle exceeding that of the average American is usually more 
selfish than raising a family must be successfully defended, which is unlikely. 
Clearly, many people have children for primarily selfish reasons: to continue 
genetic lines, to gain an illusory sense of immortality, to revive a marriage, to 
minimize loneliness in old age, to feel profoundly wanted, and so on” (Young 
2001, 187). Young seems to have forgotten the wording of his own imagined 
objection. The question is not whether procreation can or does (sometimes or 
often) involve selfish motives, but whether overconsumption is more selfish 
than procreation. I suppose this would be difficult to establish, but then this 
reveals an ambiguity in Young’s interpretation of the objection, and suggests a 
stronger formulation of it. 
Though Young is ostensibly concerned with the moral dimensions of 
procreation and overconsumption as activities (if you will), he shifts between 
what are essentially sociological and statistical observations (which he suggests 
are either imprecise or inconclusive) and dubious claims of non-quantifiability, 
as it suits his argument. From what standpoint should we evaluate whether one 
sort of activity involves more or less selfish motives than another? We could 
begin by taking a poll, the point of which would, I suppose, be to discover 
empirically, as a matter of psychological fact, whether people who 
overconsume generally tend to be selfish people. But what would that show? 
The moral question is whether, as a kind of activity, procreation involves more 
selfishness than overconsumption. Young also notes that an overconsuming 
couple “might have a dozen jet-skies, six jacuzzies [sic], three bars, and an 
indoor tennis court so guests will enjoy themselves” (Young 2001, 186). But 
again, the question is not whether overconsumers can be selfless in their 
overconsumption, but whether overconsumption is more selfish as an activity 
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than procreation. Ultimately Young concludes by discounting motivation as 
having any substantial bearing on our moral assessment of people’s actions as 
permissible or impermissible.4 His example involves two commercial 
fishermen: if they both overfish, but one of them does so with the intention of 
donating his surplus profit to charity, we would not and should not conclude 
that his behavior is morally permissible. 
This would seem to be a nice utilitarian conclusion to the matter, but 
Young claims no allegiances. He seems to want to play all sides against one 
another, with the point being that neither from a utilitarian nor from a 
deontological nor from a virtue-ethical point of view will procreation come out 
looking any different, morally speaking, from overconsumption. He says: 
Notice that this attempt [Dissimilarity B] to locate a relevant 
difference between [procreation and overconsumption] is not 
based on an intrinsic feature which one has and the other lacks, 
but on alleged differences in net utility; in other words, having 
children is likely to produce more good (or less bad) than an 
overconsumptive lifestyle, all things considered. In response, one 
could argue that the utilitarian theory upon which it is based is 
indefensible; therefore, though this may be a difference between 
the two, it is not a relevant difference. Obviously that response 
would satisfy non-consequentialists. Pursuing it, however, is not 
possible here, nor is it necessary; we can assume that some 
version of utilitarianism is defensible and still show that strategy 
B fails to locate a relevant difference (Young 2001, 187). 
But his treatment of happiness is just as cavalier as his treatment of selfishness. 
Even assuming a utilitarian calculus, “Social scientists, as far as I know, have not 
proven that couples with children are – on the average – happier over the 
course of a lifetime than couples without children, or that offspring will 
experience or create more joy than sorrow in their lifetimes” (ibid.). Here 
Young combines the pollster’s approach with a claim of non-quantifiability. We 
have not discovered that people who have children are on average happier than 
those without, and how could we? What metric of happiness would we or could 
we possibly use to decide such a thing? Young isn’t playing fair. He offers up the 
absence of social-scientific evidence as though it had been asked for, and then 
implies that there would be no way to establish the desired conclusion through 
social-scientific study anyway. I suppose such evidence might seem germane to 
a utilitarian calculation, but then in that case why couldn’t we assume the 
availability of an objective happiness metric, if we’re being granted the 
assumption of a utilitarian ethics? Young would at this point need a general 
argument against the possibility of a workable utilitarian calculus, but this is 
something he just got done saying he doesn’t need. 
                                                             
4 This would seem to weaken part of the basis of Young’s own argument for ME, but 
never mind. 
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In fact, his treatment of the good or happiness produced by procreation 
overlooks the obvious preference-utilitarian rejoinder that the happiness of 
procreation is of a higher or better quality than the happiness of 
overconsumption. In fact, given such conventional wisdom as “money can’t buy 
happiness” and that children are worth more than material possessions, it’s a 
wonder that Young doesn’t even consider this sort of reply. Whether people do 
in fact prefer having children to having a lot of stuff could, one would think, be 
empirically investigated, but I doubt the results would be in Young’s favor. 
Of course it’s everyone’s right, at least in a democratic society, to decide 
for themselves what they believe to be good, beyond the thin theory that 
undergirds the politico-judicial edifice itself.5 This brings us to Dissimilarity C. 
Young argues that the vaunted right to procreate is something that has lately 
been called into question, and is hotly contested. He’s right about this, of 
course; but here he had an overlooked opportunity to unify and bolster his 
entire case. The problem is that doing so in the way I’m about to suggest – the 
most natural way open to him given his analogical argument for ME – would 
reveal a fundamental weakness in his entire argumentative strategy. 
Young wants to avoid committing himself to any particular ethical 
theory, which is sensible, but he also wants to locate the harms of procreation in 
its effects. As he says, “we must keep in mind that the environmental impact of 
the Grays’ (or any couple’s) having children will be much greater than the 
Greens’ (or any childless couple’s) being excessive consumers (no matter how 
outrageous); this is so because many of those children will reproduce (and 
many of them, etc.), resulting in an environmental impact far greater than what 
a childless couple could generate via eco-gluttony” (Young 2001, 188). There is 
quite obviously a tension here which can only be addressed by some theory of 
value. I will argue that the only way this could be done effectively without 
appealing to any specific ethical theory is at present simply unavailable. 
A Stronger Defense 
Young could have unified and strengthened his entire discussion of the 
dissimilarities as follows: he could have acknowledged that, in the minds of 
many people, procreation produces something – some utility, some kind of 
happiness, some good – that overconsumption does not and could not produce; 
but he could have argued that no form of value is an island, and that even our 
estimate of the value of procreation (or of consumption, or of 
overconsumption) is variable relative to our other values, in that the joys of any 
one of them, over the long run, produce diminishing returns. 
The bottom line here is not simply the environment as such – as a 
bedrock value, or a bedrock of value – but environmental resources, children 
                                                             
5  If we assume, for the sake of argument, a Rawlsian point of view. 
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included.6 One of the harms that Young mentions arising specifically from 
procreation involves “population density, producing a variety of frustrations due 
to diminishing space, for example, overcrowded lakes, hiking trails, roadways, 
shopping malls, and backcountry” (ibid.). His concerns here seem almost 
prosaically poky (not to say liberal-bourgeois: crowded hiking trails?), but they 
actually go straight to the heart of his argument: that people, even our own 
children, (and hiking trails, for that matter) are not simply valuable for their 
own sake, whatever we may say or may think we believe, because the 
resilience of our capacity to experience anything as valuable rises and falls in 
relation to what economists call the “externalities” that the enjoyment of it 
produces. It’s not just a question of uniqueness. Diamonds are highly valued in 
our society not because they are rare (which as a matter of fact they aren’t), 
but because of what they are in our form of society. The same goes for children, 
or so Young could argue.7 
This would have enabled him to defend his analogy while at the same 
time remaining neutral on the issue of ethical theory, and it would have 
provided him with a more effective reply to the counter-arguments he 
considers – from the selfishness of overconsumption relative to procreation, 
right through to the questions of rights and inherent moral value. The problem 
is that this strategy – though free of the taint and the limited appeal of any 
particular ethical theory – would of course require a defense of its own. It’s not 
just that this isn’t Young’s main interest or concern in his essay; the defense 
I’ve proposed would support the analogy and would not require him to take any 
more of a stand than he does on its implications. Rather, the defense I’ve 
sketched implies something else: namely, that our estimate of the value of 
procreation can be amplified or diminished by our estimate of the likely quality 
of life of our offspring, relative to other factors.8 This seems to me to be the 
most natural way of defending Young’s position, but this reveals a problem that 
can’t be easily fixed. 
                                                             
6 It’s not my intention to be reductionist about this – that what makes any 
environmental feature valuable is its utility or its capacity for commodification and 
eventual consumption. My point is simply that, if we reject inherent value, as Young 
seems to do, then the value of, say, a tree is relational, and is to be located specifically in 
the relation of trees to other living and non-living things and their multifarious 
movements. 
7 This may sound cold. The love one has for one’s children is said to be unconditional, 
though of course parents do sometimes disown their offspring. We have probably all 
had the experience of disappointedly relinquishing something we deeply loved because 
it became spoiled; and particularly awful are those cases in which the thing is spoiled 
by the very process of enjoyment itself. One really can have too much of a good thing. 
8 This seems to be borne out by actual birthrates around the world. It’s well known that 
families in “developed” nations have fewer children on average, but it also seems to be 
the case that birthrates generally rise and fall in relation to expectations for future 
prosperity – both at the family and at the national level. See, for instance, Modena et al. 
(2011); and Tendo and Meewalaarachchi (2009). 
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The Real Problem: How Many People Should There Be? 
What makes Young’s argument so intriguing, and ultimately so revealing, is 
that it really just gives voice to an argument intuitively implied by the question: 
“How could you think of bringing a child into a world like this?” The only 
difference is that Young couches it specifically in terms of environmentalism. 
But given that people do in fact ask this question of each other in all 
seriousness, I find it surprising that Young’s argument – or some version of it – 
has not appeared sooner in the literature. What’s useful in this argument, and 
in this question, from a moral-psychological point of view at least, is that it 
locates the blame for the bad effects of procreation as much in one’s character 
as in the direct effect of one’s actions on others.9 
I myself have no children, and I have been accused on many occasions, 
sometimes by strangers, of being selfish for having no plans to have children. 
I’ve reached a point where I find the charge more puzzling and thought-
provoking than insulting. My first inclination has always been to take a logical 
approach: since my children do not exist and (probably) never will, I could not 
be behaving selfishly toward them. How could I be? The charge of selfishness 
would seem logically to imply that I owe it to certain potential but non-actual 
people to produce them, which sounds on the face of it like nonsense.10 And of 
course the logical extension of this would seem also to imply that I’ve got a 
moral obligation to reproduce, which just raises even more questions and 
absurdities: am I morally obligated to produce as many people as I can, or only 
as many as I can responsibly support? 
But this prompts more reflective consideration. Perhaps the point is 
that refusing to procreate implies something about me as a person; that I am 
lacking in some human virtue that I would do well to cultivate. I cannot so 
easily dismiss this thought.11 But then the question “How could you think of 
bringing a child into a world like this?” turns the tables. It’s not just the 
diminished quality of life of your (potential) children that is morally relevant, 
and that the wrong of producing them lies solely in this. It also suggests 
something about you, both as a (would-be) parent and as a person. In fact, it 
                                                             
9 This sounds, then, like a virtue-ethical argument; but this is just my starting point, not 
the destination. 
10 See Narveson (1967). 
11 Of course I am well aware that all of this may be as much a matter of instinct and 
conformity as anything. People see someone without children and the evolutionarily 
ancient part of the brain thinks that this person is a threat to the survival of the tribe; 
hence the moral outrage. But this seems to me to be too easy. Whatever may 
psychologically or physiologically or evolutionarily motivate people to say that 
someone without children is selfish, they are in fact expressing a moral claim about the 
value of human life and one’s attitudes toward it, whether or not they realize this. And I 
think this claim is worth exploring. Of course my interest in this is essentially 
philosophical. I don’t plan on letting anyone talk me into having children. More on this 
below. 
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would seem to imply that thinking of having children in a world like this would 
be selfish. Who would you benefit, other than yourself? This turns the 
accusation back on the accuser. At this point the question would seem to come 
down to who’s got the more accurate view of the current and (likely) future 
state of things.12 But in fact the question of who benefits raises an even trickier 
question. 
Derek Parfit (1984) makes the observation that “in a report of a U.S. 
Senate Commission on Population Growth and the American Economy, it is 
claimed that ‘there would be no substantial benefits from the continued growth 
of the U.S. population.’ This report never considers whether, if extra Americans 
were born, this might benefit these Americans” (Parfit 1984, 487). Could you 
benefit someone by bringing them into existence? To say that you can would 
seem to involve the same sort of absurdity as saying that I am being selfish to 
my non-existent children. But Parfit thinks that the claim that you can benefit 
someone by causing them to exist is defensible and not clearly absurd. Parfit 
claims that if we can judge parts of our lives as having or as not having been 
worth living through, then surely we can make the same sort of judgment 
about a whole life. And he thinks it’s reasonable to say that a good life is better 
than nothing. This, he thinks, does not imply the absurd claim that if someone 
had not existed, this would have been worse for them. So we can say without 
absurdity that causing someone to exist can be a benefit to them, even though 
if they had never existed this could not have been a harm. 
As John Leslie rightly observes: “whatever duties we have towards 
possible people are shrouded by philosophical mists, and the mists become 
particularly thick in the cases of those possible people who won’t ever become 
actual” (Leslie 1996, 177). The conceptual issues involved in coming-to-be and 
going-out-of-being are deeply puzzling and would seem, at a minimum, to 
require ontological commitments of a kind that make the moral questions 
especially murky. If potential people can be said to have identities (in some 
sense), as Leslie claims, then we can presumably have direct duties of some 
sorts to these people. Leslie makes the intuitively plausible claim that 
“completely detailed descriptions can in theory be given of [potential people].”13 
Indeed, he could, I think, get by with the weaker claim that the indirect or 
                                                             
12 I am going to assume for the purposes of this discussion – though the assumption 
may not be warranted – that whose view is more hopeful is not morally relevant. In my 
view, hope itself is only warranted relative to the reasonably expected state of things. 
This is essentially a prejudice, but I shall take it as a premise. 
13 See Leslie (1996), ibid. If we take this claim really literally, as Jan Narveson (1967) 
does, then it starts to sound a lot less plausible; but this is, I think, to overlook its 
intuitive plausibility. Leslie perhaps goes too far in saying that we could give 
“completely detailed” descriptions of potential people, but as Parfit points out, you could 
secure a determinate reference to a non-actual person with a quite simple locution such 
as “the child I would produce with my spouse if we conceived one tonight,” and this 
person’s genetic identity at least could be precisely specified. 
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indefinite identification of potential people can be quite enough to secure a 
moral or psychological claim, such as that I would have duties to and a special 
concern for my own children, whoever they are. This puts one in mind of the 
standard criticism of both traditional utilitarian and traditional deontological 
ethics to the effect that they are indifferent as to whose interests are being 
considered.14 Procreation isn’t just the act of generating more people, after all. 
These people will not be strangers to you, but will of course be your children, by 
biological definition. And it seems reasonable to think that this carries some 
sort of moral weight. 
But even this doesn’t entirely remove the difficulty, or fully solve what 
Parfit called the Non-Identity Problem (Parfit 1984, 378). This is because, 
though it handles the identity part of the problem, it doesn’t tell us which 
potential people ought to become actual (if any). Leslie thinks that the answer 
is: as many as would have happy lives. At the other end of the spectrum we 
have David Benatar (2006), who thinks that the answer to this question is: 
none. Parfit thinks that in order to correctly answer this question we would 
need what he calls Theory X (ibid.). Theory X is the theory of beneficence that 
will enable us to figure out how many people there should be relative to the 
prospects of a certain degree of quality of life for these people. This, in turn, will 
settle the question of how many people we should produce at a given point in 
time, and, indeed, ever. 
One of the problems that Parfit discusses, having to do with our ability 
to make decisions of this sort, is what he calls The Down Escalator Case (Parfit 
1984, 382-384). We can assume that, for some population of people, adding 
people over the short run will cause transitory good effects but will produce 
long-run bad effects within three generations – from resource depletion, 
overcrowding, and all of the other things Young mentions. The problem is that 
if people of the third generation choose a replacement rate of procreation over 
population growth, they will lose the transitory good effects of growth and their 
quality of life will immediately drop and will remain lower than it would 
otherwise have for the following three generations. But if they choose 
population growth over replacement, then eventually the transitory good 
effects of growth will be outweighed by the long-run bad effects and the quality 
of life will decline even below the point at which it would have been if the third 
generation had switched to replacement. 
The real dilemma is this, however. Parfit notes that the solution to all 
this seems simple: growth for three generations followed by replacement in the 
fourth, when the long-run bad effects start to kick in. But, Parfit points out, no 
generation will be likely to willingly sacrifice the short-run good effects of 
growth and accept a lower quality of life for the sake of preventing a long-run 
                                                             
14 See, in particular, Bernard Williams (1981). 
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decline in the quality of life, particularly since the short-run effects will make it 
seem to each generation that the quality of life is just as high as it would 
otherwise have been with replacement starting in the first generation. This is 
therefore a choice that every generation must face, with growth as the most 
likely outcome, coupled with a long-run decline in the quality of life. As Parfit 
puts it, this is “an intergenerational Prisoner’s Dilemma, of a kind in which it is 
least likely that those involved will achieve a solution” (Parfit 1984, 383). 
This is ultimately the deepest strategic (and cognitive) problem with a 
moral argument like Young’s. It’s not just that this sort of arguments is “purely 
academic” and will therefore influence few people, or that even amongst those 
who would be convinced by it, their tastes will override their practical 
reasoning. The problem is much, much bigger than that. In fact, calling it a 
Prisoner’s Dilemma as Parfit does isn’t even entirely accurate. In a classic 
Prisoner’s Dilemma, the effects of my actions on me and my compatriots are 
direct. The effects of procreation on quality of life are indirect and temporally 
diffuse. The intergenerational problem of the bad effects of procreation is a 
politico-economic sorites problem. The problem is not that I think to myself: 
“how will two more kids hurt anyone?” I know perfectly well that if everyone 
thought this way the effects would be worse for us all. But it’s also not simply a 
straightforward Prisoner’s Dilemma in which my aim is to attempt to maximize 
my own benefit, as in: “if only I could ensure that I get my two kids and that 
someone else goes without.” I believe both that everyone has a right to their 
two kids and that if everyone has two kids we’ll all be worse off. And I know 
that this last claim is true because I know that the incremental aggregate effect 
of universal procreation will be bad, though I also know that the bureaucratic 
administration of the global economic and social structures designed to support 
me and my two kids will spread out these effects (both spatially and 
temporally) and render them mostly invisible to me. As Michael Ignatieff 
(2000) and others have pointed out, it’s easier to drop bombs on people you 
can’t see by pushing a button than it is to shoot them when they’re standing 
right in front of you. 
Conclusion 
The point is this: what Parfit’s Down Escalator Case shows is that (1) our 
assessment of the value of procreation is relative to the effects it causes; but (2) 
our experience of these effects practically ensures that we will fail to properly 
estimate the value of population growth; and (3) to solve this problem 
rationally we would need a moral theory that could enable us to determine how 
many people there should be. This is what Young needs if he is going to defend 
his analogy effectively. No attempt to support his analogy that avoids these 
problems would be effective, but to address them adequately would require a 
theory we don’t have. In his discussion of Dissimilarity D, Young challenges the 
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claim that human beings have (or indeed that anything has) inherent value, but 
in that case it’s hard to see how or why human interests, or really anyone’s or 
anything’s interests, should even matter in our assessment of the effects of 
procreation or population growth – or in our assessment of overconsumption, 
for that matter – unless we have some way of weighing relational value. 
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Abstract: Thomas Young (2001) argues that overconsumption and procreation 
are morally equivalent, and thus that anyone who disapproves of 
overconsumption must arrive at the same normative judgment concerning 
procreation (or procreation beyond a certain threshold). Young presents an 
analogical argument in support of his claim, and defends it against four 
varieties of objections intended to show that the analogy is weak or faulty. I 
argue that Young’s defense of his argument fails, and that though a stronger 
case can be made for his claim of moral equivalence between procreation and 
overconsumption, a full defense of the claim would unfortunately require a 
moral theory that we presently do not have (namely, Derek Parfit’s Theory X, 
the theory of beneficence that would tell us how many people there should be). 
This is unfortunate because in the absence of successful rational grounds for 
such a claim concerning the moral value (or disvalue) of procreation relative to 
resource consumption, we are likely to overlook or misjudge the moral and 
other costs of population growth. 
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